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Abstract Jo´zef M. Bochen´ski began his philosophical career as an eclectic phi-
losopher, then switched to Thomism and finally became a representative of the
analytic school. As a Thomist he wanted to reform this orientation by the resources
of modern formal logic. This tendency culminated in the establishment of the
Cracow Circle (established in 1936) whose members were Bochen´ski, Jan F.
Drewnowski, Jan Salamucha, and Bolesław Sobocin´ski. However, the program of
the Cracow Circle was rejected by most Thomists who considered traditional logic
as an entirely sufficient device of philosophy. Bochen´ski was very disappointed by
this attitude of his Thomist fellows. His evolution toward analytic philosophy, free
of any ideological pressure, can be regarded as his reaction to the conservatism of
Thomism.
Keywords Analytic philosophy  Conservatism  Empiricism  Logic 
Rationalism  Theology  The Lvov-Warsaw School  Thomism
Bochen´ski’s philosophical development comprised three phases (I omit his
engagement with Soviet studies as well as his political and moral views). He
began as an eclectic philosopher. His PhD thesis about the concept of Ding an sich
in Maurycy Straszewski, a Polish philosopher of secondary importance, symbolizes
this phase.1 This topic was suggested to Bochen´ski by Mark de Munnyck, a
J. Wolen´ski (&)
University of Information Technology and Management, Rzeszow, Poland
e-mail: wolenski@if.uj.edu.pl
J. Wolen´ski
Krasickiego 14/12, 30-503 Krakow, Poland
1 See Bochen´ski (1975). See also talks of Jan Parys with Bochen´ski published as Bochen´ski (1988).
123
Stud East Eur Thought (2013) 65:5–15
DOI 10.1007/s11212-013-9184-8
professor of philosophy in Fribourg (Switzerland). Bochen´ski explicitly said that he
was forced to write this dissertation by de Munnyck who was his supervisor. In fact,
Bochen´ski had a very low opinion of his PhD thesis and even suggested (in private
conversations with the author) that he was ashamed of it. Bochen´ski’s second phase
began about 1930, when he became familiar with mathematical logic. In the
beginning, he taught himself this field by reading works of Bertrand Russell
(Bochen´ski always considered the Principia Mathematica as one of the most
important books for him), Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Alonzo Church and Haskell
Curry. Reading of Ajdukiewicz resulted in Bochen´ski’s contacts with the Lvov-
Warsaw School, particularly with works of Polish logicians. In the 1930s, he
personally met Ajdukiewicz and other leading representatives of this school, namely
Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Les´niewski, Alfred Tarski, and Tadeusz Kotarbin´ski.2
Bochen´ski, as a Dominican father, accepted Thomism as his philosophical
background. Contacts with logicians convinced him that the traditional scholasti-
cism should be modernized by using devices taken from modern symbolic logic.3
This task became the main goal of the so-called Cracow Circle, a group of Catholic
philosophers formed in 1936 (see below for details). The third phase of Bochen´ski’s
philosophy (starting in the 1960s) consisted in an essential modification of his
earlier views. He explicitly said that he became an analytic philosopher and did not
wish to be considered as a Thomist.
Bochen´ski’s final philosophical views can be summarized in the following
points:
(1) Rationalism (the world is an ordered whole);
(2) Antirelativism and antiscepticism (true knowledge is possible);
(3) Logical account of knowledge (knowledge is a logically ordered system);
(4) Inductivism (empirical knowledge is achieved by induction and it is fallible);
(5) Platonism (there are ideal objects);
(6) Anthropological naturalism (human beings are parts of nature);
(7) Antipositivism (for Bochen´ski, a consequence of Platonism);
(8) Aristotelianism (empiricism, ontology is logic, the priority of the real over the
ideal);
(9) Antirrationalism (one should reject all views which are not based on logic or
empirical evidence; ‘‘Outside logic, there is only nonsense’’—as he pro-
claimed with his very characteristic and radical exaggeration).
Moreover, Bochen´ski had a surprisingly great respect for Hegel and much less
for Kant. He used to say that the former’s false opinions are better than the latter’s
true views.
It is interesting that the points (1)–(9) do not concern religious matters. Of
course, Bochen´ski remained a faithful Catholic to the last days of his life, although
some of his religious views were not orthodox in certain respects, but I will not enter
2 Bochen´ski himself can be considered as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School. I did so in
Wolen´ski (1989). Bochen´ski approved this perspective in talks with me.
3 Bochen´ski was also one of the most distinguished historians of logic. In particular, he shared




into this problem.4 Clearly, the points (1)–(9) indicate that Bochen´ski radically
separated philosophy from religion. Although Bochen´ski was interested in some
problems of theology, for instance, he undertook several logical investigations into
the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas, he considered this work as purely theoretical
and independent of any religion. He was ready to defend some Thomistic
demonstrations of God’s existence (ex motu, for example), but he strongly criticized
other (the teleological argument, for example). Bochen´ski regretted that Catholic
theology had become increasingly irrational (he considered John Paul II as guilty of
this tendency), but he did not try to act counter to this style of doing divina scientia.
In his logic of religion, Bochen´ski pointed out that the structure of religious
doctrines should be investigated in the same way as any other, that is, by means of
logic and scientific methodology. This also means that the theory of religion should
abstain from serving as an apology of this or that confession.
Bochen´ski did not define analytic philosophy by a single condensed formula.5 He
maintained that, due to a considerable plurality of currents in the analytic camp,
such a definition is impossible. According to him, if one wants to characterize
analytic philosophy, he or she should start with a fixed list of analytic philosophers.
Bochen´ski cites as typical representatives of analytic thought Kazimierz
Ajdukiewicz, John L. Austin, Rudolf Carnap, Roderick Chisholm, Richard R.
Martin, Karl Popper, Willard van O. Quine, Nicolas Rescher, Gilbert Ryle, Heinrich
Scholz, Peter Srawson, Alfred Tarski, and Paul Weingartner. The next step consists
in looking for common views among the members of this group. Bochen´ski
proposes four distinctive denominations expressed by terms (labels) as helpful for
understanding what analytic philosophy is: ‘‘analysis’’, ‘‘language’’, ‘‘logic’’ and
‘‘objectivism’’. More precisely, analytic philosophers perform detailed analytic
works, investigate language, respect logical rules and strive to be objective. In
particular, the first feature defends philosophy against its identification, very
frequent throughout history, with world-views, that is, ideologies, religions, etc.
This is a metaphilosophical characterization of analytic thought by Bochen´ski and
thereby presents a scheme for doing philosophy. Now, points (1)–(9) as stated above
fulfill this framework in a certain way. There is no reason to discuss here whether all
these views of Bochen´ski agree with his general metaphilosophy or whether all the
philosophers he cites can be qualified as belonging to the analytic school (for
example, Popper himself did not agree to be included in the analytic camp).
Furthemore, naturalism is not necessarily a component of analytic philosophy. It
was accepted by Quine and Popper, but rejected by Chisholm. Similarly Carnap was
a positivist but Strawson was not. Leaving such unavoidable controversies aside as
depending on fairly complex interpretations, one very important thing should be
noted in this context. Clearly, Bochen´ski’s metaphilosophical as well as his
substantive views constitute a different philosophical position than that to which he
cleaved during the 1930s. At that time, Bochen´ski wanted to improve not only
4 It is related to Bochen´ski’s considerations entitled ‘‘What is religious faith?’’ He was afraid (I know that
from a letter written to me shortly before his death) that his views about religion would be qualified as a
heresy.
5 See Bochen´ski (1993). This paper is based on Bochen´ski’s inagural lecture ‘‘U¨ber die analytische
Philosophie’’ delivered at the Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg in 1985. Cf. Bochen´ski (1986).
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Thomistic philosophy by using formal logical tools, and he also hoped to defend
religion against its critics. Hence, the question arises why did Bochen´ski give up his
earlier views? My claim is that his participation in the Cracow Circle and his
subsequent recognition that the projected reform of Thomism via logic had failed,
contributed to the evolution of his thought toward a-religious analytic philosophy.
The Cracow Circle consisted of four philosophers including (other than
Bochen´ski) Father Jan Salamucha (Łukasiewicz’s student, the author of interesting
works in the history of logic), Jan F. Drewnowski (Kotarbin´ski’s student, the author
of a philosophical program recommending logic as an instrument of philosophy)
and Bolesław Sobocin´ski (Les´niewski’s student, a logician).6 In September 1936,
the 3rd Polish Philosophical Congress took place in Cracow. Father Konstanty
Michalski, professor at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow and a reputed
historian of medieval philosophy, invited a group of philosophers to discuss the
mutual relations of Catholic thought and contemporary logic (32 persons accepted
the invitation). Specially prepared papers were delivered by Łukasiewicz (‘‘In
defence of logistic’’), Bochen´ski (‘‘The tradition of Catholic thought and
preciseness’’), Jan Salamucha (‘‘A confrontation of Scholastic logical devices and
logistic ones’’) and Drewnowski (‘‘New Scholasticism and the modern requirements
of science’’). Next, these papers were discussed by representatives of traditional
scholastic philosophy. The entire material, ordered and supplemented by the
extensive replies of Bochen´ski (‘‘Logistic ‘relativism’’’) and Salamucha (‘‘On the
‘mechanization’ of thinking,’’ ‘‘A possibility of formalization of the domain of
analogical concepts’’) was published in a book form.7 Michalski, who hosted the
meeting, wrote an introduction in which he said:
It is known that Rev. Zybura distributed the questionnaire concerning the
vitality and non-vitality of contemporary peripatetic philosophy in the United
States. Replies came from the camp sympathetic to scholasticism as well as
from the opposite camp. The voices radically condemning the traditional style
of philosophical thinking were not numerous. Good advice also appeared from
the opposite camp. This advice was most often fruitful in its effects, because it
exhibits the existing inaccuracies. Among other things, it was pointed out that
contemporary peripatetic philosophy, mostly taught in seminars for priests, did
not enter into a contact with new mathematical logic, although it could find in
it inspiration for its own development. […]
Since one of the main centres of the creative work in mathematical logic has
arisen in Poland, the relation of peripatetic philosophy to mathematical logic
must necessarily be revised in our country. To pursue an ostrich policy would
demonstrate our own inner powerlessness. Hence one should positively
acknowledge that, on the occasion of the congress of Polish philosophers in
Cracow, a separate meeting has taken place between representatives of
6 I use here the material from my paper Wolen´ski (2003). Many details about the Cracow Circle can be
found in Bochen´ski (1988). See also Wolak (1995).
7 See Salamucha (1937). At the end (pp. 155–193) one can find an extensive French summary of the
papers and discussion. The English translation of Łukasiewcz’s paper is included in Łukasiewicz (1970:
236–249). Most of Salamucha’s papers are published in Salamucha (2003).
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mathematical logic and representatives of Christian philosophy for the sake of
a trustful and sincere discussion of the problem.8
The Cracow Circle arose as a result of the meeting organized by Michalski
It is perhaps interesting that a similar problem was discussed at the Cracow
Congress, independently of the methodological problems of Thomism. Here is
Sobocin´ski’s report (my italics):
In Poland special conditions arose, which caused the problem of mathematical
logic and its applications to philosophy to be particularly important and vital.
It is a result of the fact that the largest and the most influential philosophical
group consists of people who, directly or indirectly are connected with the
school of Prof. K. Twardowski. He was able to impart to the philosophical
community he created the conviction that in philosophy precisely defined
concepts, explicitly stated assumptions and correct arguments are required.
This group of philosophers, although fairly different in their philosophical
views, easily grasped the need to replace traditional logic by mathematical
logic. […]. Hence at the Congress in Cracow the representatives of logistic
stressed that […], independently of the accepted world-view and the
philosophical current, one must apply the principles discovered by logic in
carrying one’s own inferences. This was strongly stressed by Prof.
K. Ajdukiewicz during one discussion. He stated quite simply that […] one
must be conscious that modern logic must be applied by everybody who wants
to infer something responsibly, independently of assumptions underlying the
given philosophical system. This concerns theists and atheists, Catholics or, let
us assume, satanists. Modern logic must be used in proofs of God’s existence
as well as in other proofs. One should know that modern logic neither assumes
nor implies any metaphysics, but if by using it one derives some philosophical
consequences, this means that some extralogical theses have been presup-
posed. Declarations of this kind were provoked by interventions of various
participants at the Congress who, speaking more or less precisely and
responsibly, offered a couple of reservations concerning the possibility or
necessity of applying logistic to philosophy. Different accents could be found
in these statements. The standpoint that excessive precision and responsibility
in inferences can damage philosophy […] was the exception. […] The [other]
group declared that philosophy, in particular, metaphysics, has its scientific
methods and that only these methods lead to proper results. On the other hand,
according to this view, the application of mathematical logic, for example to
metaphysics in a manner similar to that occurring in the special sciences, only
simplifies and vulgarizes problems without producing proper solutions. The
representatives of this standpoint almost never questioned the importance of
mathematical logic (incidentally speaking, they seldom had a sufficient
8 Salamucha (1937: 7).
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knowledge of it), but only denied its usefulness in investigating philosophical
questions.9
In the light of this report, the discussion during the meeting organized by
Michalski was a mirror of a more general controversy concerning the nature of
philosophy and its methods conducted at the Cracow Congress. It is very probable
that Sobocin´ski, in his report about the entire congress, also summarized standpoints
concerning the application of modern logic to Thomism. On the other hand, very
similar questions were also discussed by Polish, so to speak, secular philosophers.
Thus, the Cracow Circle undertook methodological problems which were vital for
all Polish philosophy.
The philosophical program of the Cracow Circle was based on the belief that
mathematical logic strongly influenced the development of the philosophical
sciences in Poland. Its achievements and methods began to be applied to various
extra-logical problems. Mathematical logic taught Polish philosophers how to be
precise in arguments and directed their attention to the importance of logical and
semantic analysis in elaborating philosophical problems.
This general program had to be qualified somehow in order to be coherent with
Catholicism as a religion. The Cracow Circle was entirely loyal to Catholic
orthodoxy. In particular, theology was considered as a negative norm for
philosophy. Thus, the philosophers of the Cracow Circle assumed that philosophy
and Christian theology are necessarily coherent. This is evidence that the members
of the Cracow Circle shared the basic views of Thomas Aquinas about the relation
between philosophy and theology, although only Bochen´ski and Salamucha
explicitly declared themselves as Thomists. A far-reaching optimism was another
mark of the discussed project. The members of the Cracow Circle were convinced
that reformed Catholic (scholastic) thought will outstrip all other philosophical
currents.
The main features of the methodology recommended by the Cracow Circle can
by summarized under the following points:
(a) The Formulation and defence of the Catholic world-view requires application
of all modern methods of thinking;
(b) One must distinguish the formal elements of the theory from the proper
content of its teaching;
(c) Making the theory precise consists in changing and perfecting the formal
conceptual apparatus without destroying any of the essential content given by
tradition;
(d) Improving the content means that the related research covers all domains of
humans thought and takes them into account, including those that are neutral
or even inimical to the Catholic standpoint.
According to the Cracow Circle, Catholic philosophical doctrine should be
formalized and even axiomatized. This claim concerned mostly ontology considered
as applied logic. The justification of this postulate was similar to that offered as in
9 B. Sobocin´ski (1936: 434).
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other circles recommending logic as a good method of philosophy. This logical way
of doing philosophy introduces exactness, precision of form in arguments and
makes it possible to eliminate ambiguities and various defects of clarity. Thanks to
such prospects, the language of philosophy can be essentially improved. Similar
benefits concern the quality of arguments. For instance, logic can contribute to far
better formulations of arguments for the existence of God or ways of speaking about
His attributes. Philosophy in this respect is similar to mathematics, where, by
formalizing and axiomatizing suitable theories, we can speak about Non-Euclidean
spaces, real numbers and infinite sets, objects regarded as transcending usual human
standards and resources of conceivability. Thus, logic, according to this project,
offers a way (or even the only way) to convert Thomism into a normal scientific
philosophy. This idea concurred with the general philosophical tenets of the Lvov-
Warsaw School, which very strongly influenced Bochen´ski and his colleagues.
An important place in the programme was attributed to its historical justification. In
particular, Bochen´ski argued that Catholic philosophy always, or at least during its
golden era that is in the Middle Ages, respected the highest standards of precision. In
particular, Thomas Aquinas used the best logical devices available to him. According
to Bochen´ski, Aquinas would have no reservations about mathematical logic. This was
partly based on Łukasiewicz’s view that there is a visible continuity in formal logic
from Aristotle to the twentieth century, though eventually with interruptions caused by
the epistemological trend in philosophy. Bochen´ski returned to this problem after
several years. He contrasted Mr. Paleo (a scholastic orthodox thinker), Mr. Neo (an
anti-philosophical modern logician) and the Aristotelian (an enlightened philosoph-
ical logician who knows mathematical logic as well as history of logic and
philosophy.10 This last attitude should be adopted by contemporary Thomists if they
actually want to continue the methodological strategy of their master. Salamucha
formulated two criteria for assessing philosophical systems. One appeals to the range
of their content, the other to basic methodological principles defining the status of their
theses. Thus, we can distinguish (a) maximalism as regards the range of content and
methodological minimalism (for example, Bergson), (b) minimalism as regards the
range of content and methodological maximalism (for example, logical empiricism).
Now we can and should look for (c) methodological maximalism combined with
maximalism as regards the range of content. Thomism improved by mathematical
logic is a candidate for such a philosophy.11
Of course, it is much easier to propose a philosophical program than to realize it.
Fortunately, in the case of of the Cracow Circle we do have concrete attempts to
pursue these declared claims. Its members undertook several analyses in order to
demonstrate that modernization of Catholic philosophy via logic is possible and
useful. This can be illustrated by several examples; for instance, advanced
formalizations of traditional cosmological proofs of God’s existence (Salamucha,
10 See Banks (1962); Banks was a pseudonym of Bochen´ski; this paper was originally published in
Dominican Studies III (1950), pp. 139–153.
11 Salamucha (1946) (this paper is not included into Salamucha’s collection mentioned in note 7).
Perhaps we should complete Salamucha’s matrix by adding (d) minimalism as regards the range of
content and minimalism in method. Postmodernism is an example of this combination. Bochen´ski would
have been delighted by this assessment of Derrida and his fans.
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Bochen´ski), Bochen´ski’s studies on analogy, Salamucha’s treatment of the concept
of essence and the levels of abstraction (he abandoned the traditional Thomistic
account of this problem), or Salamucha’s suggestions about how to formalize
analogical concepts as typically ambiguous in the sense of the theory of logical
types as exposed in Whitehead’s and Russell’s Principia Mathematica.12 All these
and other investigations were very original and novel, not only with respect to Neo-
Scholasticism. They could open a new chapter in the history of Catholic philosophy.
Hence, the question of how successful the project of the Cracow Circle was is
reasonable and interesting.
Historically speaking, the Cracow Circle was active for a very short time only.
World War II ended its history. Salamucha, who was the spiritus movens of this
group (Bochen´ski always stressed this point), was killed in the Warsaw Uprising in
1944. Bochen´ski and Sobocin´ski left Poland after 1945; in fact, the former received
Swiss citizenship before 1939, but he frequently travelled to Poland to meet Polish
logicians and philosophers. The latter never returned to Poland after the war,
Bochen´ski did so in 1987 for the first time after 1945. Drewnowski was the only
member of the Cracow Circle who remained in Poland, but his academic activities
were considerably restricted. One could eventually speculate about a possible
development of this group in more favourable historical circumstances, but it would
be mostly counterfactual considerations. Although it is difficult to compare the
Cracow Circle, in fact, a small group of four people with such philosophical
communities as the Vienna Circle or the Lvov-Warsaw School, let me point out that
both of the latter disappeared after 1945 and never reappeared in their pre-war form.
Of course, both schools persisted through the published works of their particular and
distinguished representatives, but not as collective enterprises. The fate of the
Cracow Circle was similar to that of more powerful philosophical camps. Although
Bochen´ski himself continued to work in the spirit of the Cracow Circle to the last
days of his philosophical creativity and a few others (for instance, Ivo Thomas,
Albert Menne or Weingartner) did similar things, these efforts remained on the
margins of Neo-Scholasticism. Bochen´ski, Sobocin´ski and Thomas even tried to
reactivate the Cracow Circle but they soon gave up this idea. Since we cannot say
anything definitive about what could happen, the only way is to look at what could
have happened with the project of reforming Catholic philosophy by formal logic.
As far as I know, Bochen´ski was the only person who tried to explain why the
philosophical proposal of the Cracow Circle was not successful on a larger scale. His
diagnosis pointed out the main cause to be the negative attitude of most Catholic
philosophers toward using logic in philosophy. Bochen´ski and other members of the
Cracow Circle were perfectly conscious that traditional Catholic philosophers
considered mathematical (or symbolic) logic as something very questionable. This
was clear even before 1936, that is, the year in which the Cracow Circle was
established.13 For instance, Jacques Maritain, a very influential Catholic philosopher
recommended traditional logic as entirely sufficient for doing philosophy. The attitude
12 A more detailed presentation of these views is given in my paper mentioned in note 6.




of most Thomists toward mathematical logic was decisively hostile or at best
suspicious. Some Thomistic thinkers pointed out that mathematical logic leads to
atheism (Russell was mentioned as a principal example, in Poland the same judgement
concerned Kotarbin´ski and Les´niewski). In Poland, Rev. Augustyn Jakubisiak
published a book in which he radically criticized the use of mathematical logic in
philosophy, in particular the attempts undertaken in Polish philosophy.14 Łukasiewicz
replied in the same year (1936) and patiently corrected several misunderstandings.15
Thus, the Cracow Circle arose as a response to this negative evaluation of philosophical
importance of the new logic. It is even indicated by the title of the published proceeding
of the meeting organized by Michalski: Catholic Thought in the Light of Modern Logic.
The discussions in Krakow were very heated. Bochen´ski, Drewnowski, Łukasiewicz
and Salamucha defended logic as an instrument of philosophy. Michalski was
sympathetic to this attitude. Father Jo´zef Chechelski, Father Piotr Chojnacki, Father
Jo´zef Pastuszka and Father (one of Poland’s archbishops) Jan Stepa represented the
conservative side and expressed more or less negative opinions about the usefulness of
modern formal logic in philosophy. They accused mathematical logic of convention-
alism, relativism, positivism, mechanizing thinking, ignoring content in favour of
formalism, liquidating metaphysics, and repeated Maritain’s statement that there is no
reason to go beyond traditional Aristotelian logic which suffices for all actual
philosophical needs. The defenders argued that logic as such does not lead to any
substantive philosophical view. They also argued that logic is neutral with respect to
atheism and theism. Thus, the objection that logic annihilates metaphysics is completely
unjustified. As far more particular issues were concerned, the friends of logic tried to
explain that objections of relativism, conventionalism, ignoring content or leading to
mechanicism in the account of thinking are all based on simple misunderstanding.
Finally, they pointed out that Catholic philosophy should be modernized by logic and
that (see also above) this tendency is consistent with the best tradition of scholasticism
represented by Thomas Aquinas who was open to innovations.
Neither side of in this controversy convinced its opponents. The success of the
Cracow Circle in 1936 consisted in publicly proclaiming its views and winning
approval on the part of several leading Polish philosophers and logicians,
particularly those grouped in the Lvov-Warsaw School; Łukasiewicz was an
especially important person in supporting efforts of the Cracow Circle. However,
given the aformentioned historical facts, this philosophical group ceased to exist in
1939. Nevertheless, the criticism of its style of doing Thomism appeared after 1945
as well. Even in Poland, where the tradition of logical philosophy was still very vital
after the war, Thomists (in particular, those belonging to the Lublin School of so-
called existential Thomism) issued several reservations against the logical analysis
of philosophy.16 The typical objections of Jakubisiak and others were frequently
14 Jakubisiak (1936).
15 J. Łukasiewicz (1936).
16 For example, see Kamin´ski (1961). This paper stresses that specific features of Thomism limit the
applicability of logic in philosophy, particularly in metaphysics. Father Kamin´ski, contrary to Catholic
pre-war enemies of logic was a competent logicians. His criticism of logic as relevant for philosophy can
be considered as a moderate position. Others, for example Father Mieczysław Albert Kra˛piec, the leader
of the Lublin School, was much more radical in this respect.
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repeated (see above). It was said that although logic is useful as a device of analysis,
one must be very careful with formalization and axiomatization, for the content of
concepts exceeds formal tools. For instance, Salamucha’s proposal to consider
analogical concepts as systematically ambiguous was rejected as entirely inconsis-
tent with the traditional account of metaphysical abstraction as governed by special
principles, elaborated by metaphysics but not by logic. Similarly, the existential
Thomists argue that the Five Ways find their sufficient justification in metaphysics.
Thus, metaphysics is prior to logic, contrary to Bochen´ski’s view that ontology is
applied logic. Although one can argue that contemporary scholastic philosophers
have a (little) more sympathy for modern logic, this only means, at least as far
logic’s significance for philosophy is concerned, that they recovered the moderate
position of the 1930s. Otherwise, logic is tolerated but not recommended as
something important for philosophy.
Bochen´ski was very annoyed by the failure of the project of the Cracow Circle.
This is clearly expressed by the following quotations:
I am reporting at one philosophical congress my discovery that logic is neither
scholastic nor Aristotelian logic. Then, one young professor, a layman but
from a Catholic university says: ‘‘As a priest and a Thomist you should
know…’’. I immediately reply: ‘‘Stop, please please, a philosopher never is an
‘‘ist’’. If one wants, I am a Thomist in the sense that I accept the principal
attitude of Thomas, but I have no intention to contribute to Thomism; strictly
speaking, I dislike it.17
This conversation (of Mr. Paleo, Mr. Neo and the Aristotelian; see above—J.
W.) having become known in authoritative circles, the Aristotelian has been
excluded from two Academies of which he was formerly a member, that of
Tradition and that of Science. It was stated in the first that a man who dares to
read Principia Mathematica instead of the Logique du Port Royal is evidently
a madman; while the board of the other declared that an Aristotelian could no
be longer be tolerated in the company of scholars who have proved once for all
that all truth is relative, that of their own opinion was included.18
I was greatly annoyed when I was working on my second textbook in logic. It
was an introduction to mathematical logic. My church censor ordered me to
cancel references to scholastic thought. He argued that it is beyond any
suspicion that the Schoolmen had something similar to mathematical logic.19
We wanted to convert teachers in the seminars for priests but it was to no
avail.20
We wanted to apply mathematical logic to traditional Christian problems
considered by St. Thomas. However, we lost.21
17 Bochen´ski (1988: 125). In fact, Bochen´ski’s hostitlity to the Lublin School (and vice versa) was
legendary.
18 P. Banks (1962: 14, note 17).
19 Bochen´ski (1988: 15)
20 Ibiden, p. 19.
21 Ibidem, p. 139.
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Irony and disappointment ring out explicitly in these statements. Bochen´ski
considered the failure of the program of the Cracow Circle as the ruin of hopes for
making Catholic philosophy rational or scientific. He considered the conservatism
of Thomists as the main cause of this situation. As I already conjectured, it is very
likely that the loss of the logically oriented reform of traditional scholastic thought
directed Bochen´ski toward analytic philosophy as free of any pressure from the side
of world-views.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
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